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DeP.: Joinder of Crimes in the Same Indictment
STUDENT NOTES
April, 1920, and the evidence showed the offense to have been
committed in January, 1920. In holding the indictment bad, the
court said the question of fact is immaterial since it is necessary that
it show an offense not barred by the statute of limitations. In the
Rector case the indictment, found in April, 1946, alleged the commission of the offense in December, 1946, followed by a recital that
it was committed "within one year from (italics supplied) the finding of this indictment." In holding that the lower court did not
err in overruling a motion to quash the indictment, the court said
that the policy is to sustain indictments for misdemeanors where
it is directly alleged that the offense was committed within one
year previous to the finding thereof", and this direct allegation will
not be overcome by a mistaken date, where from all the circumstances, as here, such mistake appears to have been the result of a
clerical error." There appears to be no logical reason why the
same rule would not apply in the Price case. Of course, the Price
case alleges a date which would be barred by statute and the Rector
case states a date subsequent to the finding of the indictment, but
it is submitted that this provides no solid ground for distinction.
Especially is this true in light of the emphasis on the words used in
the recitals, that the offenses were committed within the statutory
period. The language in the Price case was "next preceding the
finding," whereas in the Rector case the allegation was "from the
finding". The word "from" could be given prospective as well as
retrospective connotations. If "from" will cure a defective allegation of time, it seems that "next preceding" should.
W. T. S.

JOINDER OF CRIMES IN Tm SAME INDICTMENT.-While the joining of crimes in the same indictment may be regulated by statute,1
the practice was familiar at common law. 2 Crimes of the same
general character, subject to like punishment and arising from
the same transaction could be joined. Trial of like crimes was
1See, for example, W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 3, § 12; c. 62, art. 2, §§ 5, 24, art.
3, § 19 and art. 9 § 9 (Michie, 1949). Statutes in other jurisdictions allowing
a joinder of offenses have been sustained. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396 (1894); Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 390 (1897); People v.
Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 263 Pac.. 226 (1928); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass.
405, 140 N.E. 465 (1923).
2 Queen v. Castro, 5 Q.B.D. 490 (1880). No joinder was strictly illegal since
the pendency of one accusation could not be pleaded in bar or abatement of
another charge. Thus, the court had discretion in ruling on a motion to
quash for a misjoinder of offenses. 1 BISHOP, Nmv CRIMINAL PROCEDiURE § 424
(2d ed. 1913).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
thought not unduly involved, and the proof of one charge would
probably be inseparable from the proof of the others." A curious
anomaly grew up around the practice of describing a single criminal act or transaction in the language of various crimes for the
purpose of avoiding an acquittal by reason of any unexpected
variance between allegation and evidence.4 Each count of the
charge was required to be so drafted that it would appear that a
separate and distinct offense was being alleged. Thus, upon a
motion to quash the indictment for a misjoinder of offenses, the
court would not know whether in fact unrelated transactions were
being alleged or a single or connected transaction variously described. Generally speaking, the court would overrule the motion
to quash, and leave the defendant to his remedy of requiring the
prosecution to elect at some later stage of the trial an offense upon
which to seek conviction. 5
In West Virginia, there is abundant authority under statutes
6
for joining offenses, apparently distinct, to meet the evidence.
These statutes, permitting joinder in specialized situations wherein
one criminal transaction constitutes two or more crimes, seem to be

but declaratory of the common law. They are often referred to as
statutes creating a "family of offenses".7
3 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 404 (1894). In accordance with a
general policy of making distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors, the
principle as to misdemeanors at common law was more liberal in that dissimilar crimes could be included together in the same charge. State v. Jarrell,
76 W. Va. 263, 265, 85 S.E. 525, 526 (1915). A felony could not be joined with
a misdemeanor, however, because a felon was denied the right to counsel and
a copy of the indictment, rights secured to a misdemeanant. Scott v. Com.,
14 Gratt. 687 (Va. 1858). A dilemma would be faced were the accused charged
both as a felon and a misdemeanant in the same indictment. The doctrine
of merger was a device to repress this problem; the misdemeanor being considered lost in the felony. There was no merger when the felony and the
misdemeanor were distinct and the one not a necessary constituent of the
other. The doctrine of merger has been abolished in most states, and usually
there is no objection to the joinder of felonies and misdemeanors. Cf. W. VA.
CODE c. 62, art. 3, § 18 (Michie, 1949).
4 Another purpose has been stated thusly: "..

if there is a legal doubt

what form of charge the court will approve ... to shape the record that disaster
will not come from unexpected rulings." 1

BISHOP,

NEw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 422.
rSome West Virginia cases intimate that a motion to quash should be
sustained if, on the face of the indictment, distinct transactions are charged.
State v. Ringer, 84 W. Va. 546, 100 S.E. 413 (1919). But the separateness of
the transactions must be clearly apparent. State v. Smith, 24 W. Va. 814 (1884).
Cf. State v. Neff, 169 Kan. 116, 218 P.2d 248 (1950) (transactions may appear
on face of indictment to be unrelated); Webb v. State, 177 Ga. 414, 170 S.E. 252
(1933) (allegation of connectedness unnecessary).
6 State v. Cutlip, 131 W. Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948) (burglary and breaking and entering); State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S.E. 116 (1925) (larceny
and embezzlement); State v. Haskins, 92 W. Va. 632, 115 SE. 720 (1923) (larceny
and temporary taking).
7State v. Hudson, 93 W. Va. 435, 117 SXE. 122 (1923).
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In addition, joinder of offenses has been sustained in this
jurisdiction under statflites setting forth an aggregation of unlawful
acts or omissions, all, several, or any one of which will constitute the
punishable offense. State v. Tabets involved an indictment containing six counts for related offenses under the "numbers"
statute. 9
West Virginia has no comprehensive statute such as is found
in a number of jurisdictions allowing joinder of felonies 0 although
certain of the traditional requisites are absent." However, the
fact that the offenses may be subject to different punishments seems
not be to an obstacle to joinder even in this jurisdiction when the
offenses are otherwise joinable. In State v. Varner,12 the contention
on this ground was not even answered by the court.
The Kansas cases indicate that dissimilarity in the nature of
the offenses committed ought not to prevent joinder when their
commission has been connected in time, place and circumstance.1
It may. be provided by statute that the court shall exercise its
discretion in ruling on the question when similar, although unconnected, crimes are charged. 14 This liberal view of joinder
states that the reason for separate charges and separate trials fails
when the acts constituting the crimes are linked together in a
series in such a manner that they become one comprehensive
8 136 W. Va. 239, 67 S.E.2d 326 (1951).
9W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 10, §§ 11, Ila, lib (Michie, 1949). See, also, State
v. Masters, 106 W. Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928), for a similar decision under the
"hit and run" statute, W. VA. CODE C. 17, art. 8, § 23 (Michie, 1949), and State
v. Hamilton, 133 W. Va. 394, 56 S.E.2d 544 (1949), a decision under the reckless
driving statute. W. VA. CODE C. 17, art. 8, § 18 (Michie, 1949). The nearest approximation to the liberal view of joinder, discussed above, reached in West
Virginia has occurred in the specialized statutory situations.
10 See note 3 supra, for the principle with respect to misdemeanors.
11 In Massachusetts and Kansas liberalized joinder has been effected without
express statutory provision. Carlton v. Commonwealth, 5 Metc. 532 (Mass.
1842) (joinder allowed although offenses distinct); State v. Thompson, 139 Kan.
59, 29 P.2d 1101 (1934). 9 MAss. ANN. LAws c. 277, § 46 (1933) is not inconsistent in that it simply provides that a single crime may be variously
described in the language of related crimes. See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 954
(Deering, 1941), and N.Y. CODE CR. PRoc. § 279 (1945). Under the New York
statute, similar crimes may be joined, subject to discretion in the court to
order separate trials if the offenses are found to be unrelated in commission,
and dissimilar crimes may be joined, provided they are parts of one transaction.
The court may impose concurrent or consecutive penalties in its discretion. Cf.
W. VA. CoDE c. 61, art 11, § 21 (Michie, 1949), and FED. R. CRiar. P., Rules 8,
13, 14. The Rules permit codefendants to be charged with dissimilar offenses,
especially when the proof is inseparable. Scheve v. United States, 184 F.2d
695 (D.C. Cir. 1950). In contrast to Massachusetts and Kansas, Oklahoma by
statute has provided that an indictment may charge only a single offense. 22
OKL. STAT. ANN. § 404 (1937).
12 131 W. Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948).
'3 State v. Martin, 175 Kan. 373, 265 P.2d 297 (1953).
'4 N.Y. CoDE Ci.im. P. § 279 (1945).
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transaction. They may be considered as exhibitions of conduct
concatenated in time, place, and circumstance, comprising one
composite event. 15 Thus, if evidence of one offense tends to
corroborate proof of another, the defendant is not being unlawfully prejudiced.-6 Evidence of only one state of facts is being
given.
R. L. DeP.

STATUTORY

RAPE-PREVIOUS

CHASTE

CHARAcTER.-Modern

statutes creating the offense commonly known as statutory rape
present an interesting paradox. Although the statutes are designed
to impose "a barrier across which the profligate proceeds at his
peril,"' fundamental notions of justice where the male is concerned
have resulted in the tempering of the statutes through inclusion of
various provisos. Such a qualification was added to the West
Virginia statute in 1931 when the requirement that the female
must be of "previous chaste character" was included. 2
The extent to which the unchaste character of the female of
tender years can be relied upon as a defense has yet to be determined by the West Virginia court. For although it has been held
that the state can not rely on a presumption of chastity, but must
allege and prove that the female is of previous chaste character, "
the question of what is meant by previous chaste character has been
left unanswered.
In other jurisdictions utilizing the phrase in either statutory
rape or seduction statutes, there is a difference of opinion as to
the meaning of previous chaste character. Under the most widely
accepted view, previous chaste character means more than reputation 4 or purity of conduct;5 it defines a female who has never
voluntarily had previous sexual intercourse.6
15 State v. Thompson, 139 Kan. 59, 29 P.2d 1101 (1934); accord, People v.
Bundte, 87 Cal.App.2d 735, 197 P.2d 823 (1948).
16 "Where the impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how
long the action continues. If successive impulses are separately given, even
though all unite in a common stream of action, separate indictments lie." 1
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (12th ed. 1932). It would seem that an indictment
ought never to be quashed on the ground of misjoinder of offenses, and that
the accused should be made to await the determination of the connectedness
of the offenses . See note 5 supra.
1 State v. Adkins, 106 W. Va. 658, 663, 146 S.E. 732, 734 (1929).

2 W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 2, § 15 (Michie, 1949).
3 State v. Ray, 122 W. Va. 39, 7 S.E.2d 654 (1940).
4 State v. Foster, 225 S.W. 671 (Mo. 1920).
GState v. Sigler, 116 Wash. 581, 200 Pac. 323 (1921).
GLowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So.2d 106 (1944).
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